3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ronni Baslund 0b269e7ea7 feat(auth): enforce operator/partner platform isolation
A partner or tenant admin could complete the dezky-operator OIDC flow and
land on the operator portal. The platform-api OperatorGuard already 403s
their data, but the login/UI layer had no authorization check at all — the
only gate was a manual Authentik UI setting with nothing in git enforcing it.

Close it with defense-in-depth across three independent layers:

1. IdP — operator-application.yaml blueprint binds an
   ak_is_group_member("dezky-platform-admins") policy to the dezky-operator
   app, so Authentik denies the OIDC flow for non-admins. The blueprint also
   provisions the provider + application (state: created, so a fresh env is
   built from code while an existing hand-made provider is left untouched).
   Wire OPERATOR_OIDC_* into both authentik containers and mount the
   blueprints dir on the worker (it applies blueprints, and previously lacked
   the mount).

2. Operator app — require-platform-admin.global.ts requires platformAdmin and
   routes a non-admin to not-authorized.vue, which triggers a full sign-out
   (local + Authentik IdP) for shared-workstation safety. Fails open on a
   transient /api/me error by design, to avoid mass-signout on platform-api
   restarts; layers 1 and 3 contain the exposure.

3. platform-api — OperatorGuard (unchanged) requires dezky-operator audience
   plus platformAdmin resolved from the DB on every request.

Also harden the partner surface: it shares the dezky-portal client with tenant
users so it has no IdP gate, and its /partner/* route middleware now fails
CLOSED when identity can't be confirmed.

Docs (AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md) and .env.example updated; the operator client secret
must be set before first boot since the blueprint now consumes it.
2026-05-30 15:48:01 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 22b2583f0b chore(services): rename services/provisioning -> services/platform-api
O.0 prep from OPERATOR-PLAN.md. Mechanical refactor before adding partner
management and operator-specific endpoints. The service now owns more than
just provisioning orchestration (it'll soon own partners, tenant lifecycle
actions, multi-audience JWT validation), so the name 'platform-api' reflects
its scope better.

What changed:
- Directory: services/provisioning/ -> services/platform-api/
- Package: @dezky/provisioning -> @dezky/platform-api
- Docker: container_name dezky-provisioning -> dezky-platform-api;
  compose service key 'provisioning' -> 'platform-api'; volume
  provisioning_node_modules -> platform_api_node_modules
- Portal: PROVISIONING_INTERNAL_URL env var -> PLATFORM_API_INTERNAL_URL,
  default URL http://provisioning:3001 -> http://platform-api:3001 in all
  three proxy routes (me.get.ts, tenants/index.post.ts, tenants/[slug]/
  reconcile.post.ts), plus NUXT_API_BASE updated
- Health endpoint service identifier and main.ts log lines updated to
  'dezky-platform-api'
- Docs swept: README, CLAUDE.md, SERVICES.md, AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md,
  NEXT-STEPS.md, TROUBLESHOOTING.md, OPERATOR-PLAN.md, traefik/dynamic.yml

What deliberately stays:
- Internal module names ProvisioningService / ProvisioningModule (those
  describe an orchestration sub-concern, not the service's purpose)
- Tenant.provisioningStatus / provisioningErrors field names (state
  per integration, not service name)
- File services/platform-api/src/tenants/provisioning.service.ts
- 'Hetzner provisioning' references in production-prep docs (infrastructure
  provisioning, unrelated)

Verified end-to-end after rename: /api/me returns 200 with profile + 2
tenants + subscription, /api/tenants/dezky/reconcile returns 200 with
Authentik integration still ok.

OPERATOR-PLAN.md O.0 checkboxes ticked.
2026-05-24 00:35:01 +02:00
Ronni Baslund adfd9baafe chore: initial scaffold with running local stack and portal auth
Brings up Dezky's local development environment end-to-end:

Infrastructure (docker-compose):
- Traefik v3.7 reverse proxy with mkcert TLS (v3.2 couldn't speak Docker API 1.54)
- Postgres + Mongo + Redis with healthchecks and init script for per-service users
- Authentik 2025.10 (server + worker) as OIDC IdP
- Stalwart v0.16 mail server (image renamed from stalwartlabs/mail-server)
- OCIS 7.0 with PROXY_TLS=false and OCIS_CONFIG_DIR=/etc/ocis so init writes
  where the server reads
- Collabora office, plus the portal + provisioning service stubs
- Docker network aliases on Traefik so containers resolve auth.dezky.local etc.
  through the network (not host /etc/hosts)
- Docker socket mount parameterized for macOS Docker Desktop symlink path

Authentik provisioning (done via API after stack boot):
- ocis-provider (public client) + OCIS Files application
- dezky-portal provider (confidential) + Dezky Portal application
- Admin API token bound to akadmin manually since 2025.10's
  AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN env var doesn't auto-materialize a token row

Portal (apps/portal):
- Nuxt 3 with nuxt-oidc-auth 1.0.0-beta.11 against generic 'oidc' preset
- Global auth middleware; login at /auth/oidc/login redirects to Authentik
- Visual implementation of Claude Design 'Auth' canvas: AuthShell, NodeMark,
  Auth* sub-components, design tokens as CSS custom properties
- Pages: auth/login, auth/expired, auth/disabled, index (post-login landing)
- mkcert root CA mounted into the portal so Node fetch trusts Authentik's
  self-signed cert (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS) — dev only

Docs:
- AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md updated with manual token bind + portal provider scripted
  alternative
- NEXT-STEPS.md: Phase 1 and Phase 2 marked done with file locations and
  dev-mode caveats

Dev-mode shortcuts that need to be revisited before prod:
- skipAccessTokenParsing on the OIDC config
- NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS mkcert mount
- Bootstrap password still the generated value in .env
- Authentik admin token (dezky-bootstrap-token) is non-expiring
2026-05-23 21:25:11 +02:00