9c65a65bcddbe4f42eda93041624c96ba97907ea
14 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Ronni Baslund
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22925599e7 |
chore(compose): wire Stripe env into platform-api
Pass STRIPE_SECRET_KEY, STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET and BILLING_STRIPE_ENABLED into the platform-api service from the gitignored .env. Defaults keep billing dark (derived data) when unset. |
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Ronni Baslund
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0bd4e5498e |
feat: portal redesign, pricing catalog, partner-staff invites
- portal: new admin/ and partner/ surfaces with full component library (AppLauncher, Avatar, Badge, Card, Modal, Tabs, etc.), composables, layouts, partner-routing middleware, and supporting server APIs - pricing: Price schema/module with operator CRUD, pricing.vue catalog UI, Subscription extended with cycle/currency/perSeatAmount/seats snapshots for stable MRR aggregation - partner staff: User.partnerId, invite-partner-user DTO and flow, /partners/:slug/users endpoints, InvitePartnerUserModal, shared dezky-partner-staff Authentik group - /me: partner-aware endpoint returning user + partner context so portal can route between end-user and partner-admin surfaces - tenant: seats field for portfolio displays and future MRR calculations - operator: pricing page, signed-out page, useMe/useToast composables, ToastStack |
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Ronni Baslund
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4d9e906ec1 |
feat(audit): cold-storage archival to S3 (Phase 4)
Final piece of the audit work. Events older than the hot retention window
move to S3-compatible object storage with signed manifests. Production uses
Hetzner Object Storage; dev uses a MinIO container with the same API.
Infra (infrastructure/docker-compose):
- New `minio` service exposing the S3 API at minio:9000 + admin console at
minio.dezky.local. Healthchecked. Bucket-init sidecar runs `mc mb` once
to create `dezky-audit`; safe to re-run.
- .env adds MINIO_ROOT_USER + MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD.
- platform-api env: AUDIT_COLD_{ENDPOINT,REGION,BUCKET,ACCESS_KEY,SECRET_KEY}
+ AUDIT_HOT_RETENTION_DAYS=90 + ARCHIVE_ENABLED=false (dormant in dev;
operator UI's "Run archive now" bypasses this gate). AUDIT_COLD_SSE
opts into SSE-S3 — left unset in dev because MinIO without a KMS rejects
AES256 PUTs with "KMS is not configured".
Platform-api (services/platform-api/src/cold/):
- cold-storage.client.ts: thin @aws-sdk/client-s3 wrapper — put/head/list.
forcePathStyle=true so MinIO and Hetzner both work; same code, env-swap.
- archive.service.ts: runOnce() selects chained events with at < cutoff →
serializes to JSONL → gzip → sha256s → uploads JSONL + signed manifest
→ HEAD-confirms both objects exist → records an ArchiveBatch doc → only
then deletes from hot Mongo. Crash-safe: a failed upload leaves events
in hot. Manifest uses the Phase 3 AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY (HMAC-SHA-256), so
archives + checkpoints share trust chain. Bypassable via { override:
true } for the operator's UI force-run.
- archive.worker.ts: hourly tick guarded by configured run-hour-UTC
(default 03:00) + day-guard so the same UTC day doesn't archive twice.
Disabled until ARCHIVE_ENABLED=true.
- archive-batch.schema.ts: { archivedAt, startSeq, endSeq, eventCount,
manifestSha256, jsonlKey, manifestKey, bytesUncompressed }. The
manifest sha256 stored in Mongo lets us detect manifest tampering
without downloading the actual manifest.
Audit module additions:
- audit.controller.ts: GET /audit/archives, POST /audit/archive/run,
/audit/verify now reports { oldestHotSeq, highestArchivedSeq } so the
UI shows the tier boundary.
Operator UI (apps/operator):
- 2 new proxies: /api/audit/archives + /api/audit/archive/run (force
override=true). Both behind operator auth via the existing platformApi
helper.
- audit.vue: new "Cold storage" card with batch table (archived-at, seq
range, event count, size, truncated manifest sha256), "Run archive
now" button + per-run result line.
Smoke-tested end-to-end:
- 7 chained events in hot. /api/audit/archive/run → ok=true, batchId
returned. JSONL + manifest both exist in MinIO (verified via mc ls +
mc cat). Mongo's chained set went 7 → 0. Verify reports
highestArchivedSeq=1446 (since we burn-allocate seqs on Authentik
dup-key rejections). Operator /audit panel shows the batch with
manifest hash 1d8263…
- First attempt with SSE-S3 enabled failed cleanly (MinIO KMS not
configured) — archive service correctly left events in hot Mongo.
Made SSE opt-in via AUDIT_COLD_SSE=true; prod turns it on.
Out of scope (each could be its own session):
- Restore-to-hot endpoint (today: download from S3 + offline query)
- Client-side encryption (today: SSE-S3 in prod, none in dev)
- Multi-region replication
- Soft TTL safety net (defense-in-depth on top of app-managed deletion)
This completes the four-phase audit log work:
1. platform-api as audit hub
2. External system ingest (Authentik / Stalwart / OCIS)
3. Hash-chain + signed checkpoints (tamper evidence)
4. Cold-storage archival (retention without unbounded Mongo growth)
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Ronni Baslund
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9435baa09d |
feat(audit): hash-chain tamper evidence + signed checkpoints (Phase 3)
The audit log now carries cryptographic chain-of-custody. Every chained
event references the previous event's sha256, and periodic checkpoints
sign the head with HMAC-SHA-256. An attacker who modifies a historical
row must also forge every checkpoint signature past it — which requires
the AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY, kept outside Mongo.
Schema (services/platform-api/src/schemas/):
- audit-event.schema.ts: new `seq` (monotonic) + `chained` (Phase-3-or-
later flag) + `prevHash` + `hash`. Compound unique index on seq with
partial filter so pre-Phase-3 rows don't collide on null.
- audit-counter.schema.ts: single doc `_id='audit_seq'`, incremented
atomically by findOneAndUpdate($inc).
- audit-checkpoint.schema.ts: { at, headSeq, headHash, signature,
sigAlg, reason }. Reason ∈ {startup, interval, threshold, manual}.
Audit module (services/platform-api/src/audit/):
- canonical.ts: stable JSON form + hashCanonical (sha256) +
checkpointSignature (HMAC-SHA-256) + verifyCheckpointSignature
(timingSafeEqual). Single source of truth for hash inputs — schema
additions land here at the same time as the field.
- audit.service.ts: record() now allocates seq → looks up lastHash() →
computes hash → inserts. Per-process write mutex serializes the
allocate+lookup so concurrent writers don't both chain off the same
predecessor. Documented multi-instance caveat (needs Mongo replica
set + transactions OR a distributed lock).
- checkpoint.service.ts: scheduler triggers on startup + every 5min
+ threshold of 100 events accumulated. Skips when no new chained
events since the last anchor.
- verifier.service.ts: walks chain in seq order, recomputes each
hash, validates checkpoint signatures. Returns a precise break:
'event-hash-mismatch' (in-place modification), 'event-prev-hash-
mismatch' (insertion/deletion), or 'checkpoint-signature-mismatch'.
- audit.controller.ts: GET /audit/verify, GET /audit/checkpoint/latest,
POST /audit/checkpoint (manual force).
Operator UI (apps/operator/):
- 3 new proxies under /api/audit/{verify, checkpoint/latest, checkpoint}.
- pages/audit.vue: new "Tamper evidence" card with "Force checkpoint"
+ "Verify chain" buttons. Header shows live head seq; result line
shows verified count or a precise break (kind + seq + expected vs
actual hash). Background tinted green/red on ok/broken.
Env (.env + docker-compose.yml):
- new AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY (32-byte hex HMAC secret). Prod swaps this for
ed25519 from an HSM/KMS; verifier code stays the same because sigAlg
is on the checkpoint doc.
Smoke-tested all three break paths against a clean chain of 5 events:
- normal verify: ok=true, 5/5 events verified, 1 checkpoint signed
- modified seq=3 in Mongo directly: verify returns ok=false with
break = { kind: 'event-hash-mismatch', seq: 3, expected, actual }
- restored, nuked checkpoint signature: break = { kind:
'checkpoint-signature-mismatch', headSeq: 5 }
- operator UI's verify panel reflects all three states correctly.
Legacy data: pre-Phase-3 events stay `chained: false` and are excluded
from the chain walk. Retroactive chaining of historical entries is a
one-off migration script we can run if we ever care to.
Out of scope (Phase 4 etc.):
- TTL + cold-storage archival to Hetzner Object Storage
- GDPR right-to-erasure tooling
- ed25519 / HSM signing (swap is well-defined; sigAlg field is ready)
- Multi-instance write coordination (Mongo transaction OR distributed
lock when we scale platform-api beyond 1 replica)
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Ronni Baslund
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df18128617 |
feat(audit): OCIS file-tail ingest worker (Phase 2 chunk 3)
Tails OCIS's JSON-Lines audit log on a shared Docker volume and forwards
mutations into AuditService. Final piece of Phase 2 — the /audit page now
unifies platform-api, authentik, and ocis events on one timeline.
services/platform-api/src/ingest/ocis.ingest.ts:
- 5s polling loop (fs.watch is unreliable across Docker bind mounts on
macOS). Stat → detect inode change or truncation → resume from byte
position OR start over.
- Cursor in IngestCursor stores lastEventId = "<inode>:<bytePosition>".
Restarts resume cleanly; on overlap the (source, externalId) unique
index dedups silently.
- Lines collected first, then processed sequentially after the read
stream closes. Earlier draft fired recordOne() from inside the
readline 'line' callback which would have resolved the stream
before all writes finished — same class of race we hit in the
Authentik worker, fixed before commit.
- Tenant inference: spaceName (set during provisioning to the slug)
first, then User.authentikSubjectId → tenantIds → Tenant.slug.
- Mutations only: OCIS_ALLOWLIST in action-map.ts whitelists 24 event
types (User/Group/Space/Share/Link/File mutations). FileDownloaded,
UserSignedIn, and the rest of the high-volume read traffic gets
skipped — keeps the timeline scannable.
services/platform-api/src/ingest/action-map.ts:
- mapOcisAction() + OCIS_ALLOWLIST. Returns null for non-whitelisted
types so the worker filters early.
infrastructure/docker-compose/docker-compose.yml:
- New named volume `ocis_audit_log` mounted writeable on the ocis
container and read-only on platform-api.
- OCIS env: OCIS_ADD_RUN_SERVICES=audit (the audit microservice is
NOT in the default `ocis server` set — opt in explicitly),
AUDIT_LOG_FILE_PATH=/var/log/ocis/audit.log, AUDIT_LOG_FORMAT=json.
- platform-api env: OCIS_AUDIT_LOG_PATH points at the same file.
Verified end-to-end with synthetic events written to the audit log:
- Worker tailed 5 events across initial read + incremental append
(5 → bytes 0:1276, then 1 → bytes 1276:1519).
- FileDownloaded correctly filtered by the allowlist (4 mutations
landed in Mongo, not 5).
- Tenant inference: events with executingUser.id resolved to
`dezky` via User → tenantIds → Tenant.slug.
- Operator /audit shows all three sources (89 events: 79 authentik
+ 5 platform-api + 5 ocis) in one unified timeline.
Known unknown — same shape as the Stalwart commit: I couldn't fully
confirm the OCIS v7 audit microservice emits events with just
OCIS_ADD_RUN_SERVICES=audit + the AUDIT_LOG_FILE_PATH env. The audit
service starts but the file stays empty until OCIS internals start
publishing events to NATS (which may need additional service-side
config). The ingest worker is correct regardless — when OCIS starts
writing real events, they'll flow into /audit. This is a follow-up
in the OCIS-side configuration, not in our ingest code.
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Ronni Baslund
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7bec940e7f |
feat(audit): Stalwart webhook ingest endpoint (Phase 2 chunk 2)
Push-based ingest for mail-server events. Adds POST /ingest/stalwart/webhook
with HMAC-SHA-256 verification, maps each event into the audit collection
under source='stalwart'.
services/platform-api/src/ingest/stalwart-webhook.controller.ts:
- Public endpoint (no JwtAuthGuard — Stalwart can't carry a JWT). Each
request is signed with STALWART_WEBHOOK_SECRET; bad signature → 401
via timingSafeEqual.
- Body: { events: [{ id, type, createdAt, data }, ... ] }. Defensive
parsing because Stalwart's payload shape has shifted across v0.16
minors — we walk what looks like a list of events and let unknown
types fall through to mapStalwartAction's catch-all.
- Per-event recordOne: action via mapStalwartAction(), actor from
data.email/account/username, IP from data.ip or X-Forwarded-For,
targetName from data.account/email/address/to, full payload kept
in metadata. externalId = evt.id so the (source, externalId)
unique index dedups re-deliveries.
action-map.ts: 14 known Stalwart event types →
stalwart.{auth_failed, auth_success, auth_banned, account_created,
account_deleted, password_changed, mail_received, mail_delivered,
mail_failed, mail_rejected, policy_rejection, dkim_failure,
dmarc_failure, spam_detected}. Snake/kebab forms normalized.
infrastructure/docker-compose:
- .env: new STALWART_WEBHOOK_SECRET shared by both containers
- docker-compose.yml: env var injected into both stalwart + platform-api
- configs/stalwart/config.toml: [webhook."audit-ingest"] block
pointing at platform-api:3001/ingest/stalwart/webhook with
signature-key = $env{STALWART_WEBHOOK_SECRET} and the 11 event
types we map.
Verified end-to-end on the receiver:
- Manual HMAC-signed POST → 200 {"received":2}, both events in Mongo
with the right action verbs (stalwart.auth_failed, stalwart.account_created),
actor/IP/externalId populated.
- Replay of the same payload → still {"received":1} but Mongo count
stays the same (dedup index works).
- X-Signature: deadbeef → 401, no row written.
Known unknown: I couldn't fully confirm Stalwart v0.16 honors the TOML
webhook config without trial-and-error on the auth event types and key
name (config.toml uses signature-key; some Stalwart builds want plain
'key'). The receiver is correct regardless — when Stalwart fires, the
events will land. If they don't, the easiest fix is to configure the
webhook from Stalwart's web admin UI at https://mail.dezky.local
instead of via TOML.
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Ronni Baslund
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55b1c133e3 |
feat(operator): scaffold apps/operator Nuxt app + multi-issuer JWT (O.3)
New Nuxt 3 app at apps/operator/ — internal admin portal on its own domain
(operator.dezky.local), own OAuth client (dezky-operator), own session
secrets, own cookies. Customer and operator surfaces can't decrypt each
other's session state.
OAuth flow verified end-to-end:
- GET / → middleware redirect to /auth/login
- User clicks Sign in → /auth/oidc/login → bounces to Authentik with
client_id=dezky-operator, scope includes 'groups'
- Authentik checks dezky-platform-admins group binding (added in O.1),
silent-reauths via the existing auth.dezky.local session
- Returns to /auth/oidc/callback with code, exchanges for token,
creates session cookie on operator.dezky.local
- Lands on pages/index.vue placeholder dashboard
Smoke test 'Create partner "test-partner"' button on the placeholder home
exercises the full operator-only authorization chain:
- 1st call: 200, partner created in Mongo
- 2nd call: 409 'already exists' (idempotency holds, token still valid)
- Same call from the customer portal: 403 'requires operator-scoped
token' (audience guard rejects dezky-portal aud)
JwtAuthGuard now multi-issuer in addition to multi-audience. Each
Authentik OAuth provider mints tokens with its own per-app iss URL
(.../application/o/<slug>/), so the guard accepts a comma-separated
AUTHENTIK_ISSUER. The audience-only fix from O.2 wasn't sufficient —
issuer is validated separately by jose.jwtVerify and was still pinned
to dezky-portal alone, yielding 'unexpected iss claim value' rejections.
Compose changes: new 'operator' service (Node 20 alpine, pnpm install +
nuxt dev, mkcert CA mount, traefik labels for operator.dezky.local +
TLS); new operator_node_modules volume; operator.dezky.local added to
traefik's Docker network aliases. Distinct OPERATOR_NUXT_OIDC_* session
secrets pulled from .env (gitignored, generated via openssl).
Real operator screens (sidebar, topbar, tenants, partners, etc.) come
in O.4. This commit is pure scaffolding + the security boundary proof.
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Ronni Baslund
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2db41fec5e |
feat(platform-api): multi-audience JWT + Partner CRUD + tenant lifecycle (O.2)
JwtAuthGuard now accepts a comma-separated AUTHENTIK_AUDIENCE
('dezky-portal,dezky-operator'). jose.jwtVerify takes an array and succeeds
on any match — both customer-portal and operator-portal tokens validate
against this service. Per-endpoint guards restrict further.
New OperatorGuard enforces operator-only mutations:
1. JWT audience claim includes 'dezky-operator' (proof from the token
alone that this is a privileged session)
2. ActorService-resolved User has platformAdmin=true (DB check so
revocation works without waiting for the token to expire)
Both required; either alone is insufficient.
Partner module:
- Partner schema: slug, name, domain, status, marginPct, contactInfo,
billingInfo. marginPct is one number per partner (decided in grilling)
- CRUD endpoints under @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, OperatorGuard) — every
partner mutation requires operator scope
- GET /partners returns each row with a computed customers count from
aggregating Tenant.partnerId. MRR aggregation deferred until
Subscription gains a price column
- GET /partners/:slug/tenants for the partner detail view
- DELETE soft-terminates (status='terminated') — never hard-delete
because tenants may still reference the partner
Tenant changes:
- partnerId?: Types.ObjectId (ref Partner, indexed sparse) added to
Tenant schema
- UpdateTenantDto accepts partnerId so PATCH can attach/detach
- POST /tenants/:slug/suspend and /resume — operator-only via
OperatorGuard. PATCH already covers plan/domains/partnerId changes
Smoke test: customer-portal session sends POST /api/partners through the
portal proxy → 403 "This endpoint requires an operator-scoped token". The
positive test (operator-token → 200) waits for O.3 when there's an
operator app to mint the right token.
apps/portal/server/api/partners/index.post.ts is a temporary verification
proxy — delete once the operator portal exists.
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Ronni Baslund
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22b2583f0b |
chore(services): rename services/provisioning -> services/platform-api
O.0 prep from OPERATOR-PLAN.md. Mechanical refactor before adding partner management and operator-specific endpoints. The service now owns more than just provisioning orchestration (it'll soon own partners, tenant lifecycle actions, multi-audience JWT validation), so the name 'platform-api' reflects its scope better. What changed: - Directory: services/provisioning/ -> services/platform-api/ - Package: @dezky/provisioning -> @dezky/platform-api - Docker: container_name dezky-provisioning -> dezky-platform-api; compose service key 'provisioning' -> 'platform-api'; volume provisioning_node_modules -> platform_api_node_modules - Portal: PROVISIONING_INTERNAL_URL env var -> PLATFORM_API_INTERNAL_URL, default URL http://provisioning:3001 -> http://platform-api:3001 in all three proxy routes (me.get.ts, tenants/index.post.ts, tenants/[slug]/ reconcile.post.ts), plus NUXT_API_BASE updated - Health endpoint service identifier and main.ts log lines updated to 'dezky-platform-api' - Docs swept: README, CLAUDE.md, SERVICES.md, AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md, NEXT-STEPS.md, TROUBLESHOOTING.md, OPERATOR-PLAN.md, traefik/dynamic.yml What deliberately stays: - Internal module names ProvisioningService / ProvisioningModule (those describe an orchestration sub-concern, not the service's purpose) - Tenant.provisioningStatus / provisioningErrors field names (state per integration, not service name) - File services/platform-api/src/tenants/provisioning.service.ts - 'Hetzner provisioning' references in production-prep docs (infrastructure provisioning, unrelated) Verified end-to-end after rename: /api/me returns 200 with profile + 2 tenants + subscription, /api/tenants/dezky/reconcile returns 200 with Authentik integration still ok. OPERATOR-PLAN.md O.0 checkboxes ticked. |
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Ronni Baslund
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28766b80c2 |
feat(provisioning): orchestrate Authentik/Stalwart/OCIS on tenant create
Phase 4 from docs/NEXT-STEPS.md. POST /tenants now writes Mongo AND drives external service provisioning. A new POST /tenants/:slug/reconcile endpoint retries the orchestration — useful when an upstream was down at create time or external state drifted out of band. Integration clients (services/provisioning/src/integrations/): - AuthentikClient: real implementation. ensureGroup() is idempotent — looks up the group by name, creates if missing, returns either way. Group attributes record the tenant slug + Mongo id so we can trace back - StalwartClient: stubbed. v0.16 removed the REST management API in favor of JMAP, which is significantly more work to wrap. TODO comment points to https://stalw.art/docs/api/management/overview for the follow-up - OcisClient: stubbed. Needs libregraph /drives endpoint with service-to- service auth via OIDC client_credentials Orchestration (provisioning.service.ts): - Each step runs independently; one failure doesn't roll back the others - Per-step state recorded on Tenant.provisioningStatus (ok/skipped/error/ pending) plus error message on Tenant.provisioningErrors - Steps return their own terminal state — 'skipped' for stubs, void defaults to 'ok' for real integrations - Mongoose markModified() required for nested subdoc mutations to persist - Tenant auto-flips status: pending → active when all steps are ok|skipped Portal proxy routes (apps/portal/server/api/tenants/): - POST /api/tenants and POST /api/tenants/:slug/reconcile forward the signed-in user's access token to the provisioning service. Lets the browser drive provisioning without minting tokens by hand. Will be replaced by a real "create workspace" flow with UI later docker-compose: AUTHENTIK_API_URL/STALWART_API_URL/OCIS_API_URL now point at the public Traefik-routed hostnames (with mkcert CA mounted into the provisioning container so Node fetch trusts them). Previously these pointed at internal Docker hostnames which doesn't work for Authentik because of TLS issuer mismatch against the JWT. |
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Ronni Baslund
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4bf6a85517 |
fix(stalwart): wire recovery admin + point portal tile at admin UI
- docker-compose: add STALWART_RECOVERY_ADMIN env so the env-file password works as a permanent recovery login. Without this, Stalwart prints a one-time bootstrap password to the logs and discards it after first setup - portal: mail tile now links to /admin/ (the real Stalwart admin SPA), not /login (which is the OAuth client authorization UI for IMAP/SMTP clients like Thunderbird — confusing and unrelated) The persistent admin (admin@dezky.local) was created via Stalwart's setup wizard at /admin/init and lives in the stalwart_data volume. Recovery admin in env is the "I lost the wizard credentials" escape hatch. |
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Ronni Baslund
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e0808bf13e |
fix(ocis): wire OCIS web SSO + Collabora document editing end to end
OCIS SSO was loading the SPA but never redirecting to Authentik: the default OCIS CSP only allows connect-src to itself + the awesome-ocis GitHub repo, so the metadata fetch to auth.dezky.local was blocked. Mount a custom csp.yaml and point PROXY_CSP_CONFIG_FILE_LOCATION at it (env var lives on the proxy service, not web — easy mistake). Also added the .html OIDC callback URIs to the ocis-provider in Authentik (run-time state, not in this commit). Collabora document editing required adding the OCIS collaboration service — the WOPI bridge between OCIS storage and Collabora. Key wiring: - ocis: expose embedded NATS (NATS_NATS_HOST=0.0.0.0) and gateway (GATEWAY_GRPC_ADDR=0.0.0.0:9142) so the new container can register and reach the rest of OCIS over the Docker network - collaboration: COLLABORATION_GRPC_ADDR=0.0.0.0:9301 so it registers itself in the service registry with a reachable address (default 127.0.0.1 was unreachable from cross-container callers) - collaboration: APP_ADDR uses the public host (office.dezky.local), not the internal Docker hostname — this value is sent to the browser as the iframe src - collabora: regenerate proof key on every start (coolconfig generate-proof-key) so its public key matches what coolwsd signs with; otherwise collaboration rejects WOPI calls with "ProofKeys verification failed" - collabora: ssl_verification=false (mkcert root not in Collabora's trust store), frame_ancestors=files.dezky.local (otherwise the iframe is blocked with a Danish "Indhold blokeret"), home_mode.enable=true to drop the "Explore The New" welcome popup and feedback prompt - ocis CSP: extend connect-src + frame-src to include the new hostnames Result: opening a .docx from OCIS now embeds Collabora in an iframe and the document opens for editing. Dev-mode caveats (not for prod): TLS verification disabled on Collabora's outbound WOPI calls; home_mode caps at 20 concurrent connections / 10 docs. |
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Ronni Baslund
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3d370caa62 |
feat(provisioning): tenant data model + CRUD with JWT-validated authz
Implements Phase 3 from docs/NEXT-STEPS.md. Mongoose schemas (services/provisioning/src/schemas/): - Tenant: slug, name, status, plan, domains, billingInfo, plus handles for Authentik group, OCIS space, and Stalwart domain (set in Phase 4) - User: authentikSubjectId, tenantIds[], email, name, role, platformAdmin flag - Subscription: tenantId, plan, status, Stripe IDs (unused until Phase 4) Auth (services/provisioning/src/auth/): - JwtAuthGuard verifies Authentik access tokens against the provider's JWKS with issuer + audience checks. Uses NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS to trust the mkcert root for the local Authentik cert - ActorService resolves the verified JWT into a Mongo User document — every controller reads tenantIds + platformAdmin from the DB, not the token - CurrentUser decorator extracts the JWT payload onto controllers CRUD modules: - /tenants, /users, /subscriptions with create/read/update/delete - /users/me upserts the caller's User record on every request, syncing email, name, tenantIds, and platformAdmin from the JWT's groups claim — the only place we read JWT.groups outside the bootstrap Why DB-derived authz: putting all group memberships in the JWT doesn't scale past ~50 tenants per user (header/cookie size limits, no mid-session revocation, stale data until re-login). JWT now carries identity only; the DB is the source of truth for who can see what. Seed (SeedService.OnApplicationBootstrap): idempotent creation of the default 'dezky' tenant + matching subscription. User records are created on first /users/me hit. Infrastructure: - Traefik label exposes provisioning at https://api.dezky.local (dev only) - api.dezky.local added to Docker network aliases on Traefik - mkcert root CA mounted into the provisioning container for JWKS fetch - Authentik 'groups' scope mapping created + attached to dezky-portal provider; portal now requests it as a scope - nuxt.config.ts portal: exposeAccessToken=true so Nitro forwards token; NUXT_OIDC_TOKEN_KEY fixed to base64-encoded 32 bytes (was hex, causing "Invalid key length" once exposeAccessToken turned on) Portal: apps/portal/server/api/me.get.ts is a scaffolding route that forwards the user's access token to provisioning and returns profile + tenants + subscriptions — verifies the full chain end to end. |
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Ronni Baslund
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adfd9baafe |
chore: initial scaffold with running local stack and portal auth
Brings up Dezky's local development environment end-to-end: Infrastructure (docker-compose): - Traefik v3.7 reverse proxy with mkcert TLS (v3.2 couldn't speak Docker API 1.54) - Postgres + Mongo + Redis with healthchecks and init script for per-service users - Authentik 2025.10 (server + worker) as OIDC IdP - Stalwart v0.16 mail server (image renamed from stalwartlabs/mail-server) - OCIS 7.0 with PROXY_TLS=false and OCIS_CONFIG_DIR=/etc/ocis so init writes where the server reads - Collabora office, plus the portal + provisioning service stubs - Docker network aliases on Traefik so containers resolve auth.dezky.local etc. through the network (not host /etc/hosts) - Docker socket mount parameterized for macOS Docker Desktop symlink path Authentik provisioning (done via API after stack boot): - ocis-provider (public client) + OCIS Files application - dezky-portal provider (confidential) + Dezky Portal application - Admin API token bound to akadmin manually since 2025.10's AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN env var doesn't auto-materialize a token row Portal (apps/portal): - Nuxt 3 with nuxt-oidc-auth 1.0.0-beta.11 against generic 'oidc' preset - Global auth middleware; login at /auth/oidc/login redirects to Authentik - Visual implementation of Claude Design 'Auth' canvas: AuthShell, NodeMark, Auth* sub-components, design tokens as CSS custom properties - Pages: auth/login, auth/expired, auth/disabled, index (post-login landing) - mkcert root CA mounted into the portal so Node fetch trusts Authentik's self-signed cert (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS) — dev only Docs: - AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md updated with manual token bind + portal provider scripted alternative - NEXT-STEPS.md: Phase 1 and Phase 2 marked done with file locations and dev-mode caveats Dev-mode shortcuts that need to be revisited before prod: - skipAccessTokenParsing on the OIDC config - NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS mkcert mount - Bootstrap password still the generated value in .env - Authentik admin token (dezky-bootstrap-token) is non-expiring |