Commit Graph

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ronni Baslund b1d717e466 feat(audit): Authentik events ingest worker (Phase 2 chunk 1)
Background worker that pulls Authentik's /api/v3/events/events/ on a
60s cadence and writes each event into our audit log via AuditService.
External system events now share the same /audit timeline as
internally-recorded platform mutations — operator queries don't have
to cross-reference Authentik's own UI to see logins, password changes,
group membership, impersonation, etc.

Pieces:
- src/schemas/ingest-cursor.schema.ts: one row per source, tracks
  lastEventAt + lastEventId so restarts resume without re-pulling.
- src/schemas/audit-event.schema.ts: new `externalId` field; new
  compound unique index on (source, externalId) with a partial filter
  on externalId being a string. Partial (not sparse) so internally-
  recorded events with externalId=null don't collide.
- src/audit/audit.service.ts: AuditRecordInput grows `externalId` +
  `at` fields. record() now silently swallows MongoError code 11000
  (duplicate key) so re-pulling the cursor overlap doesn't log noise.
- src/integrations/authentik.client.ts: listEvents(since, page,
  pageSize) on the existing client — reuses the admin token and base
  URL the provisioning code already configured.
- src/ingest/action-map.ts: 16 known Authentik actions → dotted
  authentik.* verbs (login, login_failed, password_changed,
  impersonation_started, …). Unknown actions fall through to
  authentik.<raw> rather than getting silently dropped.
- src/ingest/authentik.ingest.ts: OnApplicationBootstrap worker.
  Reads cursor → pulls events with created__gt=cursor, ordering=created
  ASC → paginates forward (10 pages × 100/page safety cap per tick) →
  writes each event with source='authentik' + externalId=pk + at=
  evt.created → advances cursor to the newest seen. inFlight guard
  prevents overlapping ticks. AUDIT_INGEST_ENABLED=false disables for
  test environments.
- Tenant inference: from the user's groups (same convention the portal
  flag-eval proxy uses). Admin groups stripped; first match against a
  real Tenant.slug wins. Unmatched → tenantSlug undefined, event still
  lands in the global timeline.

Smoke-tested: fresh Mongo + restart → 78 Authentik events ingested,
0 duplicates. Performed a login at app.dezky.local → next 60s tick
captured the new login row with actor email + IP. Compound unique
index on (source, externalId) verified to reject re-pulled events
silently (no error logs).

Out of scope here (covered by chunks 2 + 3):
- Stalwart webhook ingest
- OCIS file-tail ingest
2026-05-24 20:12:21 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 02341d8ba5 feat(audit): platform-api audit log + operator UI wired to real events
Phase 1 of the audit work — capture everything we control today, ingest from
external systems (Authentik / OCIS / Stalwart) in a later phase. The mock
OP_AUDIT fixture is gone; both the /audit page and Overview's activity card
now show real events recorded by AuditService.record() in platform-api.

Schema (services/platform-api/src/schemas/audit-event.schema.ts):
  AuditEvent { at, actorType, actorId, actorEmail, actorIp, action, outcome,
    resourceType, resourceId, resourceName, tenantSlug, partnerSlug, source,
    metadata, prevHash, hash }
  Indexes: {at:-1}, {tenantSlug,at:-1}, {actorId,at:-1}, {action,at:-1}.
  prevHash/hash are nullable now; hash-chain tamper evidence is a later phase.

AuditService:
  - record() — best-effort write, swallows errors so the underlying mutation
    that succeeded isn't failed by a downstream log issue. Surfaces failures
    via Logger.
  - list() — filters: since/until/before, action (exact OR prefix match
    via leading-anchor regex), tenantSlug, partnerSlug, actorEmail, outcome,
    free-text q across action/resourceName/actorEmail/tenantSlug, limit
    (default 100, max 500). Cursor pagination via `before`.
  - No UPDATE/DELETE surface — entries are append-only by construction.

AuditController: GET /audit, behind JwtAuthGuard + OperatorGuard. No mutations
exposed; entries written internally by other modules.

X-Forwarded-For threading:
  - apps/operator/server/utils/platform-api.ts forwards the originating
    client IP to platform-api so audit entries carry a real address.
  - services/platform-api/src/auth/client-ip.ts extracts leftmost
    X-Forwarded-For, falls back to socket.remoteAddress.

Instrumented mutations (every one threads actor + IP through):
  Tenants: create, update, softDelete, setStatus(suspend/resume)
  Partners: create, update, terminate
  Flags:   create, update (incl. flag.killed verb when state=off+note=kill-switch),
           remove
  Users:   deactivate

Each controller resolves the User doc via ActorService, extracts IP via
clientIp(req), and passes { userId, email, ip } as AuditActor to the service.
FlagsService's local ActorRef collapses to AuditActor so flag history and the
audit log share one shape.

Operator UI:
  - /api/audit proxy that forwards query params verbatim
  - types/audit.ts
  - pages/audit.vue: real list with quick-pick action chips (All/Tenants/
    Partners/Flags/Users), outcome filter, free-text search, "Load older
    events" cursor pagination
  - pages/index.vue: Overview activity card swaps mock OP_AUDIT for the
    same /api/audit endpoint, rows link into /audit
  - data/fixtures.ts: OP_AUDIT / AuditEntry / AuditTone exports removed

Verified end-to-end: suspended + resumed acme, flipped oci_versioning through
rollout → kill → on, then /audit returned all 5 events with the right action
verbs (tenant.suspended, tenant.resumed, flag.updated, flag.killed,
flag.updated), actor admin@dezky.local, IP 192.168.65.1. Filters (action
prefix + free-text q) narrow correctly.

Out of scope for this commit (each gets its own conversation):
  - Authentik / OCIS / Stalwart ingest adapters (Phase 2)
  - Hash-chain tamper evidence (Phase 3)
  - TTL + cold-storage archival to Hetzner Object Storage (Phase 4)
  - GDPR right-to-erasure tooling
2026-05-24 19:50:24 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 868a305539 feat(flags): real feature-flag system with bulk eval + operator UI
Real backend for the flags page (was pure mock). Built so it's ready for
the first risky rollout (likely the Stalwart JMAP client or the Stripe
billing engine).

services/platform-api:
- Flag schema (key, description, state, pct, scope.{plans, tenantSlugs,
  partnerSlugs, environments}, embedded history capped at 20)
- FlagsService with CRUD + evaluateAll(tenantSlug) → { key: bool }
  Eval algorithm:
    off  → false; on → true
    targeted → require non-empty scope (empty allowlist means "nobody"),
               then match every non-empty axis
    rollout  → match scope, then sha256(`${tenantId}:${key}`) % 100 < pct
  Hash-based rollout is deterministic: bumping pct only flips the new
  slice. Pure helpers (matchesScope, hasAnyScope, inRolloutBucket) are
  exported for future unit tests.
- FlagsController exposes GET /flags, GET /flags/:key, POST /flags/evaluate
  (JwtAuthGuard); POST/PATCH/DELETE require OperatorGuard. History entries
  capture the actor's email.
- SeedService idempotently creates 10 flag keys mapping to real Dezky
  concerns (jmap_native_v2, gdpr_export_v2, new_billing_engine, etc.).
  $setOnInsert so operator edits survive restarts.

apps/operator:
- 6 proxies: /api/flags index get/post, [key] get/patch/delete, evaluate post
- types/flag.ts with the shape that mirrors the backend
- pages/flags.vue: useFetch real list, row click opens FlagDetail,
  "New flag" opens NewFlagModal, scope summary column shows targeting
  at a glance
- FlagDetail.vue: side panel with segmented state, rollout slider with
  live "~N of M tenants" preview from /api/tenants, plan/tenant/env chip
  pickers, dirty-tracked Save, instant Kill-switch (PATCH state=off+pct=0),
  embedded change history
- NewFlagModal.vue: minimal create form (key + description). Everything
  else is configured in the detail panel afterward.
- CommandPalette: feature-flag rows now come from /api/flags instead of
  the dropped fixture, so newly-created flags are searchable immediately
- data/fixtures.ts: drop FLAGS / FeatureFlag exports (replaced by the
  real backend)

Smoke-tested end-to-end: list renders 10 seed flags, opening gdpr_export_v2
and flipping to rollout 25% then saving persists + adds a history entry,
kill-switch sets state=off in one click, /api/flags/evaluate returns the
correct booleans for the seeded tenant, same tenant gets the same answer
on consecutive evals (determinism), and creating + deleting a flag through
the UI roundtrips correctly.
2026-05-24 19:21:15 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 77a09aaf77 feat(operator): live Infrastructure probes + honest split between deployed and planned
The Infrastructure page used to read from a mock fixture that lied two ways:
it listed services that aren't deployed (Jitsi, Zulip, Cloudflare, Object
Storage, Postmark) and showed hardcoded uptime/latency for the ones that
are. Now it shows truth from real probes plus a clearly-labelled "planned"
section for the rest.

Backend (services/platform-api):
- New src/health/ module — HealthService runs 9 probes in parallel with a
  1.5s timeout each:
    Stalwart  → TCP stalwart:8080
    OCIS      → HTTP GET ocis:9200/health
    Collabora → HTTP GET collabora:9980/hosting/discovery
    Authentik → HTTP GET authentik-server:9000/-/health/ready/
    Postgres  → TCP postgres:5432
    Mongo     → existing Mongoose connection.db.admin().ping()
    Redis     → TCP redis:6379
    Traefik   → TCP traefik:80
    Platform API → trivially ok (this code is running)
  Status thresholds: ok ≤500ms, warn 500–1500ms, bad on timeout/refuse.
- HealthController exposes GET /health/platform behind JwtAuthGuard, plus
  keeps the existing public GET /health for infra liveness checks.
- Moved the old src/health.controller.ts into the new module.

Frontend (apps/operator):
- /api/health/platform proxy forwards the operator's access token.
- Infrastructure page swaps SERVICES fixture for useFetch with 30s auto-
  refresh + a manual Refresh button. Cards show real status badge + real
  latency; uptime/error stay as em-dash with a "no probe history yet"
  tooltip until a Prometheus/event-log backend lands.
- Below the live grid, a "Planned · not deployed" section renders 5 dimmed
  cards (Jitsi, Zulip, simpledns.plus, Hetzner Object Storage, Postmark).
  simpledns.plus replaces the misnamed Cloudflare entry — we use
  simpledns.plus, not Cloudflare.
- Subtitle is now truthful: "8 / 9 services live · checked 2s ago".

Verified: stopped redis → card flipped to "down · getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND
redis", subtitle reflected 8/9, incident banner appeared. Restarted →
back to 9/9, banner gone.

SERVICES fixture stays in place for Overview's incident banner — replacing
that is a separate follow-up tied to the incident-management backend.
2026-05-24 18:47:38 +02:00
Ronni Baslund fbbb43e3e2 feat(operator): partner management with attach/detach (O.6)
- Partners list with name/domain/status/customers/margin + Create modal
- Partner detail: contract card, contact card, customers table, attach modal,
  terminate (soft-delete) danger card
- Operator proxies for /partners + /partners/:slug/tenants
- platform-api: add partnerId Prop to Tenant schema. The field was being
  silently dropped by Mongoose because the schema didn't declare it.
- tenants.service: rewrite update() to build $set/$unset explicitly and cast
  partnerId via new Types.ObjectId(). Handles detach via $unset so the field
  vanishes from the doc cleanly.
2026-05-24 08:02:00 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 8e81730372 feat(operator): tenant list + 7-tab detail with real lifecycle (O.5)
Operator can now manage tenants end-to-end from the UI:

  - pages/tenants/index.vue — list with status/plan/domains/created/
    provisioning-state columns, search by slug or name, status chips
    with live counts (all/active/pending/suspended), click-through
    to detail
  - pages/tenants/[slug].vue — 7-tab detail (Overview, Users, Resources,
    Billing, Audit, Support, Danger zone)
  - 3 tabs hit real backends: Overview (identity + billing fields),
    Users (lazy-loaded via new GET /tenants/:slug/users endpoint),
    Resources (live provisioning state per integration + Reconcile button)
  - 3 tabs render mock fixtures with warn-tone "mock" badges: Billing
    (Stripe placeholder), Audit (sample log lines), Support (placeholder
    pending the ticket queue work)
  - Danger zone: 3 real-backend cards (Suspend / Resume / Soft-delete),
    each gated by a ConfirmDialog modal. Verified live — clicked
    Suspend on acme, status flipped to 'suspended' in Mongo, then
    Resumed back to 'active'

platform-api additions:
  - GET /tenants/:slug/users returns users with this tenant in their
    tenantIds, sorted by last login. Same authorization rule as the
    existing /tenants/:slug — platform admins always pass,
    non-admins must be a member of the tenant
  - tenants.module imports User schema for the new lookup

New components (apps/operator/components/):
  - Tabs.vue — horizontal strip with optional per-tab counts, v-model
  - ConfirmDialog.vue — Teleport-to-body modal, Escape/backdrop close,
    danger/primary tone for the confirm button

Server proxy infrastructure (apps/operator/server/):
  - utils/platform-api.ts — single helper encapsulating
    access-token-from-session + bearer-forward + error normalization.
    Every operator proxy route is now a one-liner against this helper
  - api/tenants/index.get.ts, [slug]/{index.get,index.patch,index.delete,
    users.get,suspend.post,resume.post,reconcile.post}.ts

Two real bugs found and fixed during the smoke test:

  - Mongoose subdocument `_id` leaks into JSON when iterating
    tenant.provisioningStatus. Switched to an explicit
    `['authentik', 'stalwart', 'ocis']` whitelist in both v-fors
  - Documents created before provisioningErrors was added (like the
    acme tenant) don't have the field at all in JSON. Use optional
    chaining (`tenant.provisioningErrors?.[k]`) instead of bracket
    access. Without it: 'Cannot read properties of undefined (reading
    "authentik")' during the Resources tab render
2026-05-24 07:44:23 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 55b1c133e3 feat(operator): scaffold apps/operator Nuxt app + multi-issuer JWT (O.3)
New Nuxt 3 app at apps/operator/ — internal admin portal on its own domain
(operator.dezky.local), own OAuth client (dezky-operator), own session
secrets, own cookies. Customer and operator surfaces can't decrypt each
other's session state.

OAuth flow verified end-to-end:
  - GET / → middleware redirect to /auth/login
  - User clicks Sign in → /auth/oidc/login → bounces to Authentik with
    client_id=dezky-operator, scope includes 'groups'
  - Authentik checks dezky-platform-admins group binding (added in O.1),
    silent-reauths via the existing auth.dezky.local session
  - Returns to /auth/oidc/callback with code, exchanges for token,
    creates session cookie on operator.dezky.local
  - Lands on pages/index.vue placeholder dashboard

Smoke test 'Create partner "test-partner"' button on the placeholder home
exercises the full operator-only authorization chain:
  - 1st call: 200, partner created in Mongo
  - 2nd call: 409 'already exists' (idempotency holds, token still valid)
  - Same call from the customer portal: 403 'requires operator-scoped
    token' (audience guard rejects dezky-portal aud)

JwtAuthGuard now multi-issuer in addition to multi-audience. Each
Authentik OAuth provider mints tokens with its own per-app iss URL
(.../application/o/<slug>/), so the guard accepts a comma-separated
AUTHENTIK_ISSUER. The audience-only fix from O.2 wasn't sufficient —
issuer is validated separately by jose.jwtVerify and was still pinned
to dezky-portal alone, yielding 'unexpected iss claim value' rejections.

Compose changes: new 'operator' service (Node 20 alpine, pnpm install +
nuxt dev, mkcert CA mount, traefik labels for operator.dezky.local +
TLS); new operator_node_modules volume; operator.dezky.local added to
traefik's Docker network aliases. Distinct OPERATOR_NUXT_OIDC_* session
secrets pulled from .env (gitignored, generated via openssl).

Real operator screens (sidebar, topbar, tenants, partners, etc.) come
in O.4. This commit is pure scaffolding + the security boundary proof.
2026-05-24 07:20:16 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 2db41fec5e feat(platform-api): multi-audience JWT + Partner CRUD + tenant lifecycle (O.2)
JwtAuthGuard now accepts a comma-separated AUTHENTIK_AUDIENCE
('dezky-portal,dezky-operator'). jose.jwtVerify takes an array and succeeds
on any match — both customer-portal and operator-portal tokens validate
against this service. Per-endpoint guards restrict further.

New OperatorGuard enforces operator-only mutations:
  1. JWT audience claim includes 'dezky-operator' (proof from the token
     alone that this is a privileged session)
  2. ActorService-resolved User has platformAdmin=true (DB check so
     revocation works without waiting for the token to expire)
Both required; either alone is insufficient.

Partner module:
  - Partner schema: slug, name, domain, status, marginPct, contactInfo,
    billingInfo. marginPct is one number per partner (decided in grilling)
  - CRUD endpoints under @UseGuards(JwtAuthGuard, OperatorGuard) — every
    partner mutation requires operator scope
  - GET /partners returns each row with a computed customers count from
    aggregating Tenant.partnerId. MRR aggregation deferred until
    Subscription gains a price column
  - GET /partners/:slug/tenants for the partner detail view
  - DELETE soft-terminates (status='terminated') — never hard-delete
    because tenants may still reference the partner

Tenant changes:
  - partnerId?: Types.ObjectId (ref Partner, indexed sparse) added to
    Tenant schema
  - UpdateTenantDto accepts partnerId so PATCH can attach/detach
  - POST /tenants/:slug/suspend and /resume — operator-only via
    OperatorGuard. PATCH already covers plan/domains/partnerId changes

Smoke test: customer-portal session sends POST /api/partners through the
portal proxy → 403 "This endpoint requires an operator-scoped token". The
positive test (operator-token → 200) waits for O.3 when there's an
operator app to mint the right token.

apps/portal/server/api/partners/index.post.ts is a temporary verification
proxy — delete once the operator portal exists.
2026-05-24 07:08:59 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 22b2583f0b chore(services): rename services/provisioning -> services/platform-api
O.0 prep from OPERATOR-PLAN.md. Mechanical refactor before adding partner
management and operator-specific endpoints. The service now owns more than
just provisioning orchestration (it'll soon own partners, tenant lifecycle
actions, multi-audience JWT validation), so the name 'platform-api' reflects
its scope better.

What changed:
- Directory: services/provisioning/ -> services/platform-api/
- Package: @dezky/provisioning -> @dezky/platform-api
- Docker: container_name dezky-provisioning -> dezky-platform-api;
  compose service key 'provisioning' -> 'platform-api'; volume
  provisioning_node_modules -> platform_api_node_modules
- Portal: PROVISIONING_INTERNAL_URL env var -> PLATFORM_API_INTERNAL_URL,
  default URL http://provisioning:3001 -> http://platform-api:3001 in all
  three proxy routes (me.get.ts, tenants/index.post.ts, tenants/[slug]/
  reconcile.post.ts), plus NUXT_API_BASE updated
- Health endpoint service identifier and main.ts log lines updated to
  'dezky-platform-api'
- Docs swept: README, CLAUDE.md, SERVICES.md, AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md,
  NEXT-STEPS.md, TROUBLESHOOTING.md, OPERATOR-PLAN.md, traefik/dynamic.yml

What deliberately stays:
- Internal module names ProvisioningService / ProvisioningModule (those
  describe an orchestration sub-concern, not the service's purpose)
- Tenant.provisioningStatus / provisioningErrors field names (state
  per integration, not service name)
- File services/platform-api/src/tenants/provisioning.service.ts
- 'Hetzner provisioning' references in production-prep docs (infrastructure
  provisioning, unrelated)

Verified end-to-end after rename: /api/me returns 200 with profile + 2
tenants + subscription, /api/tenants/dezky/reconcile returns 200 with
Authentik integration still ok.

OPERATOR-PLAN.md O.0 checkboxes ticked.
2026-05-24 00:35:01 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 28766b80c2 feat(provisioning): orchestrate Authentik/Stalwart/OCIS on tenant create
Phase 4 from docs/NEXT-STEPS.md. POST /tenants now writes Mongo AND drives
external service provisioning. A new POST /tenants/:slug/reconcile endpoint
retries the orchestration — useful when an upstream was down at create time
or external state drifted out of band.

Integration clients (services/provisioning/src/integrations/):
- AuthentikClient: real implementation. ensureGroup() is idempotent — looks
  up the group by name, creates if missing, returns either way. Group
  attributes record the tenant slug + Mongo id so we can trace back
- StalwartClient: stubbed. v0.16 removed the REST management API in favor
  of JMAP, which is significantly more work to wrap. TODO comment points
  to https://stalw.art/docs/api/management/overview for the follow-up
- OcisClient: stubbed. Needs libregraph /drives endpoint with service-to-
  service auth via OIDC client_credentials

Orchestration (provisioning.service.ts):
- Each step runs independently; one failure doesn't roll back the others
- Per-step state recorded on Tenant.provisioningStatus (ok/skipped/error/
  pending) plus error message on Tenant.provisioningErrors
- Steps return their own terminal state — 'skipped' for stubs, void
  defaults to 'ok' for real integrations
- Mongoose markModified() required for nested subdoc mutations to persist
- Tenant auto-flips status: pending → active when all steps are ok|skipped

Portal proxy routes (apps/portal/server/api/tenants/):
- POST /api/tenants and POST /api/tenants/:slug/reconcile forward the
  signed-in user's access token to the provisioning service. Lets the
  browser drive provisioning without minting tokens by hand. Will be
  replaced by a real "create workspace" flow with UI later

docker-compose: AUTHENTIK_API_URL/STALWART_API_URL/OCIS_API_URL now point
at the public Traefik-routed hostnames (with mkcert CA mounted into the
provisioning container so Node fetch trusts them). Previously these
pointed at internal Docker hostnames which doesn't work for Authentik
because of TLS issuer mismatch against the JWT.
2026-05-24 00:06:40 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 3d370caa62 feat(provisioning): tenant data model + CRUD with JWT-validated authz
Implements Phase 3 from docs/NEXT-STEPS.md.

Mongoose schemas (services/provisioning/src/schemas/):
- Tenant: slug, name, status, plan, domains, billingInfo, plus handles for
  Authentik group, OCIS space, and Stalwart domain (set in Phase 4)
- User: authentikSubjectId, tenantIds[], email, name, role, platformAdmin flag
- Subscription: tenantId, plan, status, Stripe IDs (unused until Phase 4)

Auth (services/provisioning/src/auth/):
- JwtAuthGuard verifies Authentik access tokens against the provider's JWKS
  with issuer + audience checks. Uses NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS to trust the
  mkcert root for the local Authentik cert
- ActorService resolves the verified JWT into a Mongo User document — every
  controller reads tenantIds + platformAdmin from the DB, not the token
- CurrentUser decorator extracts the JWT payload onto controllers

CRUD modules:
- /tenants, /users, /subscriptions with create/read/update/delete
- /users/me upserts the caller's User record on every request, syncing email,
  name, tenantIds, and platformAdmin from the JWT's groups claim — the only
  place we read JWT.groups outside the bootstrap

Why DB-derived authz: putting all group memberships in the JWT doesn't scale
past ~50 tenants per user (header/cookie size limits, no mid-session
revocation, stale data until re-login). JWT now carries identity only; the
DB is the source of truth for who can see what.

Seed (SeedService.OnApplicationBootstrap): idempotent creation of the
default 'dezky' tenant + matching subscription. User records are created on
first /users/me hit.

Infrastructure:
- Traefik label exposes provisioning at https://api.dezky.local (dev only)
- api.dezky.local added to Docker network aliases on Traefik
- mkcert root CA mounted into the provisioning container for JWKS fetch
- Authentik 'groups' scope mapping created + attached to dezky-portal
  provider; portal now requests it as a scope
- nuxt.config.ts portal: exposeAccessToken=true so Nitro forwards token;
  NUXT_OIDC_TOKEN_KEY fixed to base64-encoded 32 bytes (was hex, causing
  "Invalid key length" once exposeAccessToken turned on)

Portal: apps/portal/server/api/me.get.ts is a scaffolding route that
forwards the user's access token to provisioning and returns profile +
tenants + subscriptions — verifies the full chain end to end.
2026-05-23 21:53:53 +02:00
Ronni Baslund adfd9baafe chore: initial scaffold with running local stack and portal auth
Brings up Dezky's local development environment end-to-end:

Infrastructure (docker-compose):
- Traefik v3.7 reverse proxy with mkcert TLS (v3.2 couldn't speak Docker API 1.54)
- Postgres + Mongo + Redis with healthchecks and init script for per-service users
- Authentik 2025.10 (server + worker) as OIDC IdP
- Stalwart v0.16 mail server (image renamed from stalwartlabs/mail-server)
- OCIS 7.0 with PROXY_TLS=false and OCIS_CONFIG_DIR=/etc/ocis so init writes
  where the server reads
- Collabora office, plus the portal + provisioning service stubs
- Docker network aliases on Traefik so containers resolve auth.dezky.local etc.
  through the network (not host /etc/hosts)
- Docker socket mount parameterized for macOS Docker Desktop symlink path

Authentik provisioning (done via API after stack boot):
- ocis-provider (public client) + OCIS Files application
- dezky-portal provider (confidential) + Dezky Portal application
- Admin API token bound to akadmin manually since 2025.10's
  AUTHENTIK_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN env var doesn't auto-materialize a token row

Portal (apps/portal):
- Nuxt 3 with nuxt-oidc-auth 1.0.0-beta.11 against generic 'oidc' preset
- Global auth middleware; login at /auth/oidc/login redirects to Authentik
- Visual implementation of Claude Design 'Auth' canvas: AuthShell, NodeMark,
  Auth* sub-components, design tokens as CSS custom properties
- Pages: auth/login, auth/expired, auth/disabled, index (post-login landing)
- mkcert root CA mounted into the portal so Node fetch trusts Authentik's
  self-signed cert (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS) — dev only

Docs:
- AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md updated with manual token bind + portal provider scripted
  alternative
- NEXT-STEPS.md: Phase 1 and Phase 2 marked done with file locations and
  dev-mode caveats

Dev-mode shortcuts that need to be revisited before prod:
- skipAccessTokenParsing on the OIDC config
- NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS mkcert mount
- Bootstrap password still the generated value in .env
- Authentik admin token (dezky-bootstrap-token) is non-expiring
2026-05-23 21:25:11 +02:00