Commit Graph

19 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ronni Baslund db26dafc64 feat(billing): sync catalog price edits to Stripe + re-price live customers
Editing a catalog amount now propagates beyond MongoDB. Stripe Prices are
immutable, so each changed currency mints a fresh Stripe Price at the new
amount, overwrites the cached stripePriceIds[currency] (which also fixes the
stale-price bug for new subscriptions), and repoints every live subscription
on that (row, currency) onto it with proration_behavior 'none' — the new
amount takes effect at the customer's next billing cycle, no mid-cycle charge.
The per-seat snapshot is refreshed so MRR reflects the go-forward rate.

Before committing the edit, the operator sees a warning with the affected
customer count, driven by a new GET /prices/:id/impact endpoint. Per-sub
failures are logged, never fatal; Stripe-disabled rows still re-snapshot.
2026-05-30 16:13:15 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 6a7802c870 feat(billing): partner payout-ledger generation (worker + operator trigger)
Add BillingService.generatePayouts: idempotent per-partner/month/currency snapshot of gross MRR x marginPct into Payout rows (never rewrites a paid row), plus platformPayouts(). A PayoutWorker generates the current month daily (and on boot; PAYOUTS_AUTOGEN=false to disable). Operator endpoints GET /billing/payouts + POST /billing/payouts/generate, an operator payouts ledger table with a Generate button, and the proxy routes. The partner Payouts tab now shows real data.
2026-05-30 14:40:01 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 9c65a65bcd refactor(operator): remove tenant creation (tenants are partner-owned)
Tenants always belong to a partner, so the operator must not create orphan (partnerless) tenants. Remove the NewTenantModal component, the POST /api/tenants proxy route, and the New-tenant button/modal from the tenants page. Tenant creation now happens only via the partner portal wizard (which forces partnerId).
2026-05-30 08:29:40 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 0e1d2fb0d1 feat(billing): Stripe-backed billing engine (dark-launched)
Add a lazy/guarded Stripe client (boots without keys), Invoice/Payout schemas, per-currency Price.stripePriceIds, and a BillingService deriving partner/platform summaries, invoices and a partner-cut payout ledger. Partner and operator billing controllers plus a signature-verified Stripe webhook (Fastify raw body). Frontend: partner and operator billing pages and the operator tenant billing/audit tabs on real data. Gated behind new_billing_engine and BILLING_STRIPE_ENABLED; live money paths stay off until keys are set.
2026-05-30 08:03:23 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 6370e392cc feat(reports): partner and platform analytics
Partner reports — health cohorts, revenue-by-plan, top customers, signup/churn cohorts, plus saved custom reports (create/list/delete). Operator platform-wide reports (MRR, revenue by plan, top tenants, growth). Replaces the reports fixtures in both apps.
2026-05-30 08:03:14 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 17ffd95a70 chore(portal,operator): upgrade to Nuxt 4
Upgrade both Nuxt apps to Nuxt 4.4.6 (vue-tsc 3, TypeScript 5.6, undici 7) and add a root tsconfig.json to each app. Fix the strict-null / noUncheckedIndexedAccess errors surfaced by Nuxt 4's stricter generated tsconfig and vue-tsc 3. Drop the nuxt-oidc-auth pnpm patch (Nuxt 4 fixes the prepare:types crash natively).
2026-05-30 08:02:43 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 0bd4e5498e feat: portal redesign, pricing catalog, partner-staff invites
- portal: new admin/ and partner/ surfaces with full component library
  (AppLauncher, Avatar, Badge, Card, Modal, Tabs, etc.), composables,
  layouts, partner-routing middleware, and supporting server APIs
- pricing: Price schema/module with operator CRUD, pricing.vue catalog UI,
  Subscription extended with cycle/currency/perSeatAmount/seats snapshots
  for stable MRR aggregation
- partner staff: User.partnerId, invite-partner-user DTO and flow,
  /partners/:slug/users endpoints, InvitePartnerUserModal, shared
  dezky-partner-staff Authentik group
- /me: partner-aware endpoint returning user + partner context so portal
  can route between end-user and partner-admin surfaces
- tenant: seats field for portfolio displays and future MRR calculations
- operator: pricing page, signed-out page, useMe/useToast composables,
  ToastStack
2026-05-28 20:00:33 +02:00
Ronni Baslund be430179d9 feat(operator): create tenant from the operator UI
Wires the previously-dead 'New tenant' button on /tenants to a modal
that collects slug + name + plan + optional primary domain, POSTs to
the existing platform-api /tenants endpoint via a new operator proxy,
and navigates into the freshly-created tenant detail page. Slug
auto-derives from the name until the operator types in the slug field
themselves. Billing details and provisioning are still done from the
tenant detail page after creation — this modal is the minimum that
backend validators will accept.
2026-05-24 22:31:49 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 9a97945565 feat(operator): invite operator → creates user in Authentik
New "Invite operator" button + modal on /operator-team. Replaces the
bounce-to-Authentik flow with an inline invite that creates the user via
the Authentik API and pre-populates our local User doc so they appear
immediately.

services/platform-api/src/integrations/authentik.client.ts:
  - findUserByEmail(): early-conflict check before we attempt the create
  - createUser(): POST /core/users/ with username = email, internal type,
    is_active, attached to the supplied group PKs
  - addUserToGroup(): kept for tenant-member invites later
  - recoveryLink(): tries POST /core/users/{pk}/recovery/, returns
    undefined when no recovery flow is configured on the Authentik brand
    (we soft-fail and the service falls back to setInitialPassword)
  - setInitialPassword(): POST /core/users/{pk}/set_password/. Returns 204
    No Content so we bypass request<T>'s JSON parser and call fetch
    directly with explicit ok check.

services/platform-api/src/users/users.service.ts:
  - inviteOperator(dto, actor) orchestrates: dedup by email →
    findOrCreate Authentik group → create user in group → pre-create
    local User doc with platformAdmin=true so the list reflects them
    immediately → try recovery link → fall back to temp password →
    record platform.user_invited audit event with handoff method.
  - Return type is { subject, userId, link? | tempPassword? } —
    exactly one credential mode set depending on Authentik config.
  - generateTempPassword(): 16-char with at least one upper/lower/digit/
    symbol, shuffled. Confusable chars (I/O/0/1/l) omitted.
  - Cached platform-admin group ID after first lookup.

services/platform-api/src/users/users.controller.ts:
  - POST /users/invite behind OperatorGuard. Calls the service with
    actor + IP from the JWT/request.

apps/operator:
  - server/api/users/invite.post.ts: standard platformApi proxy.
  - components/InviteOperatorModal.vue: 2-step form. Step 1: name +
    email with client-side validation. Step 2: shows whichever
    credential the backend returned — recovery link OR username+
    temp-password — with copy-to-clipboard buttons and a note about
    SMTP/recovery-flow follow-up paths.
  - pages/operator-team.vue: "Invite operator" replaces "Manage in
    Authentik" as the primary action; Authentik link demoted to
    secondary. Refreshes the list on @invited so the new user shows
    up without a manual reload.

Verified end-to-end against real Authentik:
  - Invite created user pk=7, uid=f22f2bb…, group=dezky-platform-admins,
    is_active=true, temp password set. Modal showed both fields with
    copy buttons; operator-team count went 1 → 2 immediately. Audit
    event recorded (platform.user_invited with handoff='temp-password').
  - Recovery link path is preferred but Authentik has no recovery flow
    configured on the default brand. AuthentikClient.recoveryLink()
    soft-fails on the "No recovery flow set." 400, returns undefined,
    and inviteOperator transparently falls back to set_password. Once
    a recovery flow is configured (Authentik admin → Flows), the link
    path becomes active and the temp-password path stops firing
    without any code changes.

Known follow-ups:
  - Configure Authentik recovery flow so the link path activates
    (one-time admin task, not in code)
  - Outbound SMTP wiring (Phase 5/6) → Authentik can email link/temp
    directly; modal stops showing the credential
  - Deactivate / remove operator from inside the app (currently still
    Authentik UI; defensible until proven needed)
  - Tenant-member invite — similar flow but adds to tenant group
    instead, exposed from /users (global users) or tenant detail
2026-05-24 21:27:46 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 4d9e906ec1 feat(audit): cold-storage archival to S3 (Phase 4)
Final piece of the audit work. Events older than the hot retention window
move to S3-compatible object storage with signed manifests. Production uses
Hetzner Object Storage; dev uses a MinIO container with the same API.

Infra (infrastructure/docker-compose):
  - New `minio` service exposing the S3 API at minio:9000 + admin console at
    minio.dezky.local. Healthchecked. Bucket-init sidecar runs `mc mb` once
    to create `dezky-audit`; safe to re-run.
  - .env adds MINIO_ROOT_USER + MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD.
  - platform-api env: AUDIT_COLD_{ENDPOINT,REGION,BUCKET,ACCESS_KEY,SECRET_KEY}
    + AUDIT_HOT_RETENTION_DAYS=90 + ARCHIVE_ENABLED=false (dormant in dev;
    operator UI's "Run archive now" bypasses this gate). AUDIT_COLD_SSE
    opts into SSE-S3 — left unset in dev because MinIO without a KMS rejects
    AES256 PUTs with "KMS is not configured".

Platform-api (services/platform-api/src/cold/):
  - cold-storage.client.ts: thin @aws-sdk/client-s3 wrapper — put/head/list.
    forcePathStyle=true so MinIO and Hetzner both work; same code, env-swap.
  - archive.service.ts: runOnce() selects chained events with at < cutoff →
    serializes to JSONL → gzip → sha256s → uploads JSONL + signed manifest
    → HEAD-confirms both objects exist → records an ArchiveBatch doc → only
    then deletes from hot Mongo. Crash-safe: a failed upload leaves events
    in hot. Manifest uses the Phase 3 AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY (HMAC-SHA-256), so
    archives + checkpoints share trust chain. Bypassable via { override:
    true } for the operator's UI force-run.
  - archive.worker.ts: hourly tick guarded by configured run-hour-UTC
    (default 03:00) + day-guard so the same UTC day doesn't archive twice.
    Disabled until ARCHIVE_ENABLED=true.
  - archive-batch.schema.ts: { archivedAt, startSeq, endSeq, eventCount,
    manifestSha256, jsonlKey, manifestKey, bytesUncompressed }. The
    manifest sha256 stored in Mongo lets us detect manifest tampering
    without downloading the actual manifest.

Audit module additions:
  - audit.controller.ts: GET /audit/archives, POST /audit/archive/run,
    /audit/verify now reports { oldestHotSeq, highestArchivedSeq } so the
    UI shows the tier boundary.

Operator UI (apps/operator):
  - 2 new proxies: /api/audit/archives + /api/audit/archive/run (force
    override=true). Both behind operator auth via the existing platformApi
    helper.
  - audit.vue: new "Cold storage" card with batch table (archived-at, seq
    range, event count, size, truncated manifest sha256), "Run archive
    now" button + per-run result line.

Smoke-tested end-to-end:
  - 7 chained events in hot. /api/audit/archive/run → ok=true, batchId
    returned. JSONL + manifest both exist in MinIO (verified via mc ls +
    mc cat). Mongo's chained set went 7 → 0. Verify reports
    highestArchivedSeq=1446 (since we burn-allocate seqs on Authentik
    dup-key rejections). Operator /audit panel shows the batch with
    manifest hash 1d8263…
  - First attempt with SSE-S3 enabled failed cleanly (MinIO KMS not
    configured) — archive service correctly left events in hot Mongo.
    Made SSE opt-in via AUDIT_COLD_SSE=true; prod turns it on.

Out of scope (each could be its own session):
  - Restore-to-hot endpoint (today: download from S3 + offline query)
  - Client-side encryption (today: SSE-S3 in prod, none in dev)
  - Multi-region replication
  - Soft TTL safety net (defense-in-depth on top of app-managed deletion)

This completes the four-phase audit log work:
  1. platform-api as audit hub
  2. External system ingest (Authentik / Stalwart / OCIS)
  3. Hash-chain + signed checkpoints (tamper evidence)
  4. Cold-storage archival (retention without unbounded Mongo growth)
2026-05-24 21:03:41 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 9435baa09d feat(audit): hash-chain tamper evidence + signed checkpoints (Phase 3)
The audit log now carries cryptographic chain-of-custody. Every chained
event references the previous event's sha256, and periodic checkpoints
sign the head with HMAC-SHA-256. An attacker who modifies a historical
row must also forge every checkpoint signature past it — which requires
the AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY, kept outside Mongo.

Schema (services/platform-api/src/schemas/):
  - audit-event.schema.ts: new `seq` (monotonic) + `chained` (Phase-3-or-
    later flag) + `prevHash` + `hash`. Compound unique index on seq with
    partial filter so pre-Phase-3 rows don't collide on null.
  - audit-counter.schema.ts: single doc `_id='audit_seq'`, incremented
    atomically by findOneAndUpdate($inc).
  - audit-checkpoint.schema.ts: { at, headSeq, headHash, signature,
    sigAlg, reason }. Reason ∈ {startup, interval, threshold, manual}.

Audit module (services/platform-api/src/audit/):
  - canonical.ts: stable JSON form + hashCanonical (sha256) +
    checkpointSignature (HMAC-SHA-256) + verifyCheckpointSignature
    (timingSafeEqual). Single source of truth for hash inputs — schema
    additions land here at the same time as the field.
  - audit.service.ts: record() now allocates seq → looks up lastHash() →
    computes hash → inserts. Per-process write mutex serializes the
    allocate+lookup so concurrent writers don't both chain off the same
    predecessor. Documented multi-instance caveat (needs Mongo replica
    set + transactions OR a distributed lock).
  - checkpoint.service.ts: scheduler triggers on startup + every 5min
    + threshold of 100 events accumulated. Skips when no new chained
    events since the last anchor.
  - verifier.service.ts: walks chain in seq order, recomputes each
    hash, validates checkpoint signatures. Returns a precise break:
    'event-hash-mismatch' (in-place modification), 'event-prev-hash-
    mismatch' (insertion/deletion), or 'checkpoint-signature-mismatch'.
  - audit.controller.ts: GET /audit/verify, GET /audit/checkpoint/latest,
    POST /audit/checkpoint (manual force).

Operator UI (apps/operator/):
  - 3 new proxies under /api/audit/{verify, checkpoint/latest, checkpoint}.
  - pages/audit.vue: new "Tamper evidence" card with "Force checkpoint"
    + "Verify chain" buttons. Header shows live head seq; result line
    shows verified count or a precise break (kind + seq + expected vs
    actual hash). Background tinted green/red on ok/broken.

Env (.env + docker-compose.yml):
  - new AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY (32-byte hex HMAC secret). Prod swaps this for
    ed25519 from an HSM/KMS; verifier code stays the same because sigAlg
    is on the checkpoint doc.

Smoke-tested all three break paths against a clean chain of 5 events:
  - normal verify: ok=true, 5/5 events verified, 1 checkpoint signed
  - modified seq=3 in Mongo directly: verify returns ok=false with
    break = { kind: 'event-hash-mismatch', seq: 3, expected, actual }
  - restored, nuked checkpoint signature: break = { kind:
    'checkpoint-signature-mismatch', headSeq: 5 }
  - operator UI's verify panel reflects all three states correctly.

Legacy data: pre-Phase-3 events stay `chained: false` and are excluded
from the chain walk. Retroactive chaining of historical entries is a
one-off migration script we can run if we ever care to.

Out of scope (Phase 4 etc.):
  - TTL + cold-storage archival to Hetzner Object Storage
  - GDPR right-to-erasure tooling
  - ed25519 / HSM signing (swap is well-defined; sigAlg field is ready)
  - Multi-instance write coordination (Mongo transaction OR distributed
    lock when we scale platform-api beyond 1 replica)
2026-05-24 20:43:54 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 02341d8ba5 feat(audit): platform-api audit log + operator UI wired to real events
Phase 1 of the audit work — capture everything we control today, ingest from
external systems (Authentik / OCIS / Stalwart) in a later phase. The mock
OP_AUDIT fixture is gone; both the /audit page and Overview's activity card
now show real events recorded by AuditService.record() in platform-api.

Schema (services/platform-api/src/schemas/audit-event.schema.ts):
  AuditEvent { at, actorType, actorId, actorEmail, actorIp, action, outcome,
    resourceType, resourceId, resourceName, tenantSlug, partnerSlug, source,
    metadata, prevHash, hash }
  Indexes: {at:-1}, {tenantSlug,at:-1}, {actorId,at:-1}, {action,at:-1}.
  prevHash/hash are nullable now; hash-chain tamper evidence is a later phase.

AuditService:
  - record() — best-effort write, swallows errors so the underlying mutation
    that succeeded isn't failed by a downstream log issue. Surfaces failures
    via Logger.
  - list() — filters: since/until/before, action (exact OR prefix match
    via leading-anchor regex), tenantSlug, partnerSlug, actorEmail, outcome,
    free-text q across action/resourceName/actorEmail/tenantSlug, limit
    (default 100, max 500). Cursor pagination via `before`.
  - No UPDATE/DELETE surface — entries are append-only by construction.

AuditController: GET /audit, behind JwtAuthGuard + OperatorGuard. No mutations
exposed; entries written internally by other modules.

X-Forwarded-For threading:
  - apps/operator/server/utils/platform-api.ts forwards the originating
    client IP to platform-api so audit entries carry a real address.
  - services/platform-api/src/auth/client-ip.ts extracts leftmost
    X-Forwarded-For, falls back to socket.remoteAddress.

Instrumented mutations (every one threads actor + IP through):
  Tenants: create, update, softDelete, setStatus(suspend/resume)
  Partners: create, update, terminate
  Flags:   create, update (incl. flag.killed verb when state=off+note=kill-switch),
           remove
  Users:   deactivate

Each controller resolves the User doc via ActorService, extracts IP via
clientIp(req), and passes { userId, email, ip } as AuditActor to the service.
FlagsService's local ActorRef collapses to AuditActor so flag history and the
audit log share one shape.

Operator UI:
  - /api/audit proxy that forwards query params verbatim
  - types/audit.ts
  - pages/audit.vue: real list with quick-pick action chips (All/Tenants/
    Partners/Flags/Users), outcome filter, free-text search, "Load older
    events" cursor pagination
  - pages/index.vue: Overview activity card swaps mock OP_AUDIT for the
    same /api/audit endpoint, rows link into /audit
  - data/fixtures.ts: OP_AUDIT / AuditEntry / AuditTone exports removed

Verified end-to-end: suspended + resumed acme, flipped oci_versioning through
rollout → kill → on, then /audit returned all 5 events with the right action
verbs (tenant.suspended, tenant.resumed, flag.updated, flag.killed,
flag.updated), actor admin@dezky.local, IP 192.168.65.1. Filters (action
prefix + free-text q) narrow correctly.

Out of scope for this commit (each gets its own conversation):
  - Authentik / OCIS / Stalwart ingest adapters (Phase 2)
  - Hash-chain tamper evidence (Phase 3)
  - TTL + cold-storage archival to Hetzner Object Storage (Phase 4)
  - GDPR right-to-erasure tooling
2026-05-24 19:50:24 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 868a305539 feat(flags): real feature-flag system with bulk eval + operator UI
Real backend for the flags page (was pure mock). Built so it's ready for
the first risky rollout (likely the Stalwart JMAP client or the Stripe
billing engine).

services/platform-api:
- Flag schema (key, description, state, pct, scope.{plans, tenantSlugs,
  partnerSlugs, environments}, embedded history capped at 20)
- FlagsService with CRUD + evaluateAll(tenantSlug) → { key: bool }
  Eval algorithm:
    off  → false; on → true
    targeted → require non-empty scope (empty allowlist means "nobody"),
               then match every non-empty axis
    rollout  → match scope, then sha256(`${tenantId}:${key}`) % 100 < pct
  Hash-based rollout is deterministic: bumping pct only flips the new
  slice. Pure helpers (matchesScope, hasAnyScope, inRolloutBucket) are
  exported for future unit tests.
- FlagsController exposes GET /flags, GET /flags/:key, POST /flags/evaluate
  (JwtAuthGuard); POST/PATCH/DELETE require OperatorGuard. History entries
  capture the actor's email.
- SeedService idempotently creates 10 flag keys mapping to real Dezky
  concerns (jmap_native_v2, gdpr_export_v2, new_billing_engine, etc.).
  $setOnInsert so operator edits survive restarts.

apps/operator:
- 6 proxies: /api/flags index get/post, [key] get/patch/delete, evaluate post
- types/flag.ts with the shape that mirrors the backend
- pages/flags.vue: useFetch real list, row click opens FlagDetail,
  "New flag" opens NewFlagModal, scope summary column shows targeting
  at a glance
- FlagDetail.vue: side panel with segmented state, rollout slider with
  live "~N of M tenants" preview from /api/tenants, plan/tenant/env chip
  pickers, dirty-tracked Save, instant Kill-switch (PATCH state=off+pct=0),
  embedded change history
- NewFlagModal.vue: minimal create form (key + description). Everything
  else is configured in the detail panel afterward.
- CommandPalette: feature-flag rows now come from /api/flags instead of
  the dropped fixture, so newly-created flags are searchable immediately
- data/fixtures.ts: drop FLAGS / FeatureFlag exports (replaced by the
  real backend)

Smoke-tested end-to-end: list renders 10 seed flags, opening gdpr_export_v2
and flipping to rollout 25% then saving persists + adds a history entry,
kill-switch sets state=off in one click, /api/flags/evaluate returns the
correct booleans for the seeded tenant, same tenant gets the same answer
on consecutive evals (determinism), and creating + deleting a flag through
the UI roundtrips correctly.
2026-05-24 19:21:15 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 77a09aaf77 feat(operator): live Infrastructure probes + honest split between deployed and planned
The Infrastructure page used to read from a mock fixture that lied two ways:
it listed services that aren't deployed (Jitsi, Zulip, Cloudflare, Object
Storage, Postmark) and showed hardcoded uptime/latency for the ones that
are. Now it shows truth from real probes plus a clearly-labelled "planned"
section for the rest.

Backend (services/platform-api):
- New src/health/ module — HealthService runs 9 probes in parallel with a
  1.5s timeout each:
    Stalwart  → TCP stalwart:8080
    OCIS      → HTTP GET ocis:9200/health
    Collabora → HTTP GET collabora:9980/hosting/discovery
    Authentik → HTTP GET authentik-server:9000/-/health/ready/
    Postgres  → TCP postgres:5432
    Mongo     → existing Mongoose connection.db.admin().ping()
    Redis     → TCP redis:6379
    Traefik   → TCP traefik:80
    Platform API → trivially ok (this code is running)
  Status thresholds: ok ≤500ms, warn 500–1500ms, bad on timeout/refuse.
- HealthController exposes GET /health/platform behind JwtAuthGuard, plus
  keeps the existing public GET /health for infra liveness checks.
- Moved the old src/health.controller.ts into the new module.

Frontend (apps/operator):
- /api/health/platform proxy forwards the operator's access token.
- Infrastructure page swaps SERVICES fixture for useFetch with 30s auto-
  refresh + a manual Refresh button. Cards show real status badge + real
  latency; uptime/error stay as em-dash with a "no probe history yet"
  tooltip until a Prometheus/event-log backend lands.
- Below the live grid, a "Planned · not deployed" section renders 5 dimmed
  cards (Jitsi, Zulip, simpledns.plus, Hetzner Object Storage, Postmark).
  simpledns.plus replaces the misnamed Cloudflare entry — we use
  simpledns.plus, not Cloudflare.
- Subtitle is now truthful: "8 / 9 services live · checked 2s ago".

Verified: stopped redis → card flipped to "down · getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND
redis", subtitle reflected 8/9, incident banner appeared. Restarted →
back to 9/9, banner gone.

SERVICES fixture stays in place for Overview's incident banner — replacing
that is a separate follow-up tied to the incident-management backend.
2026-05-24 18:47:38 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 19e1a4fca3 chore(operator): O.9 verification + roll follow-ups into NEXT-STEPS
- Add _verify-token.get.ts to both operator and portal — decodes the
  access token stored in the nuxt-oidc-auth session and echoes iss/aud/
  sub/groups. Used to confirm operator tokens carry aud=dezky-operator
  and portal tokens carry aud=dezky-portal. Listed in NEXT-STEPS.md as
  throwaway, to be removed when proper verification surfaces exist.
- OPERATOR-PLAN.md O.9 marked done with the actual claims captured + the
  Mongo-side verification of attach + suspend flows.
- NEXT-STEPS.md: replaced the "Operator portal — out-of-band track"
  section with a "shipped + follow-ups" version. The 9-item follow-up
  list (impersonation, audit, flags, incidents, support, partner
  portal, env switcher, on-call, workspace impersonation) is now the
  authoritative roadmap, not buried inside OPERATOR-PLAN.md.
2026-05-24 08:47:56 +02:00
Ronni Baslund e0ac643e80 feat(operator): visual-only screens with real-data overview (O.7)
- Overview (pages/index.vue): KPIs from real /tenants /partners /users,
  status meter, recent + needs-follow-up tables. Mock activity stream and
  incident banner overlay come from data/fixtures.ts.
- Operator team: real GET /users filtered to platformAdmin === true,
  with last-seen + tenant counts.
- Users (global): real read with All/Admins/Inactive views and search.
- Infrastructure / Feature flags / Audit: mock fixtures only — wiring to
  real backends (Prometheus, OpenFeature, append-only audit) is tracked
  as follow-ups in OPERATOR-PLAN.md.
- Placeholder pages (support/billing/reports/settings) via OpPlaceholder.
- Shared: Stat, MetricCell, OpPlaceholder components, /api/users proxy,
  PlatformUser type.
- .gitignore: scope the docker volumes data/ rule so apps/*/data/ is
  tracked again (operator carries mock fixtures there).
2026-05-24 08:17:26 +02:00
Ronni Baslund fbbb43e3e2 feat(operator): partner management with attach/detach (O.6)
- Partners list with name/domain/status/customers/margin + Create modal
- Partner detail: contract card, contact card, customers table, attach modal,
  terminate (soft-delete) danger card
- Operator proxies for /partners + /partners/:slug/tenants
- platform-api: add partnerId Prop to Tenant schema. The field was being
  silently dropped by Mongoose because the schema didn't declare it.
- tenants.service: rewrite update() to build $set/$unset explicitly and cast
  partnerId via new Types.ObjectId(). Handles detach via $unset so the field
  vanishes from the doc cleanly.
2026-05-24 08:02:00 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 8e81730372 feat(operator): tenant list + 7-tab detail with real lifecycle (O.5)
Operator can now manage tenants end-to-end from the UI:

  - pages/tenants/index.vue — list with status/plan/domains/created/
    provisioning-state columns, search by slug or name, status chips
    with live counts (all/active/pending/suspended), click-through
    to detail
  - pages/tenants/[slug].vue — 7-tab detail (Overview, Users, Resources,
    Billing, Audit, Support, Danger zone)
  - 3 tabs hit real backends: Overview (identity + billing fields),
    Users (lazy-loaded via new GET /tenants/:slug/users endpoint),
    Resources (live provisioning state per integration + Reconcile button)
  - 3 tabs render mock fixtures with warn-tone "mock" badges: Billing
    (Stripe placeholder), Audit (sample log lines), Support (placeholder
    pending the ticket queue work)
  - Danger zone: 3 real-backend cards (Suspend / Resume / Soft-delete),
    each gated by a ConfirmDialog modal. Verified live — clicked
    Suspend on acme, status flipped to 'suspended' in Mongo, then
    Resumed back to 'active'

platform-api additions:
  - GET /tenants/:slug/users returns users with this tenant in their
    tenantIds, sorted by last login. Same authorization rule as the
    existing /tenants/:slug — platform admins always pass,
    non-admins must be a member of the tenant
  - tenants.module imports User schema for the new lookup

New components (apps/operator/components/):
  - Tabs.vue — horizontal strip with optional per-tab counts, v-model
  - ConfirmDialog.vue — Teleport-to-body modal, Escape/backdrop close,
    danger/primary tone for the confirm button

Server proxy infrastructure (apps/operator/server/):
  - utils/platform-api.ts — single helper encapsulating
    access-token-from-session + bearer-forward + error normalization.
    Every operator proxy route is now a one-liner against this helper
  - api/tenants/index.get.ts, [slug]/{index.get,index.patch,index.delete,
    users.get,suspend.post,resume.post,reconcile.post}.ts

Two real bugs found and fixed during the smoke test:

  - Mongoose subdocument `_id` leaks into JSON when iterating
    tenant.provisioningStatus. Switched to an explicit
    `['authentik', 'stalwart', 'ocis']` whitelist in both v-fors
  - Documents created before provisioningErrors was added (like the
    acme tenant) don't have the field at all in JSON. Use optional
    chaining (`tenant.provisioningErrors?.[k]`) instead of bracket
    access. Without it: 'Cannot read properties of undefined (reading
    "authentik")' during the Resources tab render
2026-05-24 07:44:23 +02:00
Ronni Baslund 55b1c133e3 feat(operator): scaffold apps/operator Nuxt app + multi-issuer JWT (O.3)
New Nuxt 3 app at apps/operator/ — internal admin portal on its own domain
(operator.dezky.local), own OAuth client (dezky-operator), own session
secrets, own cookies. Customer and operator surfaces can't decrypt each
other's session state.

OAuth flow verified end-to-end:
  - GET / → middleware redirect to /auth/login
  - User clicks Sign in → /auth/oidc/login → bounces to Authentik with
    client_id=dezky-operator, scope includes 'groups'
  - Authentik checks dezky-platform-admins group binding (added in O.1),
    silent-reauths via the existing auth.dezky.local session
  - Returns to /auth/oidc/callback with code, exchanges for token,
    creates session cookie on operator.dezky.local
  - Lands on pages/index.vue placeholder dashboard

Smoke test 'Create partner "test-partner"' button on the placeholder home
exercises the full operator-only authorization chain:
  - 1st call: 200, partner created in Mongo
  - 2nd call: 409 'already exists' (idempotency holds, token still valid)
  - Same call from the customer portal: 403 'requires operator-scoped
    token' (audience guard rejects dezky-portal aud)

JwtAuthGuard now multi-issuer in addition to multi-audience. Each
Authentik OAuth provider mints tokens with its own per-app iss URL
(.../application/o/<slug>/), so the guard accepts a comma-separated
AUTHENTIK_ISSUER. The audience-only fix from O.2 wasn't sufficient —
issuer is validated separately by jose.jwtVerify and was still pinned
to dezky-portal alone, yielding 'unexpected iss claim value' rejections.

Compose changes: new 'operator' service (Node 20 alpine, pnpm install +
nuxt dev, mkcert CA mount, traefik labels for operator.dezky.local +
TLS); new operator_node_modules volume; operator.dezky.local added to
traefik's Docker network aliases. Distinct OPERATOR_NUXT_OIDC_* session
secrets pulled from .env (gitignored, generated via openssl).

Real operator screens (sidebar, topbar, tenants, partners, etc.) come
in O.4. This commit is pure scaffolding + the security boundary proof.
2026-05-24 07:20:16 +02:00