0b269e7ea7
A partner or tenant admin could complete the dezky-operator OIDC flow and
land on the operator portal. The platform-api OperatorGuard already 403s
their data, but the login/UI layer had no authorization check at all — the
only gate was a manual Authentik UI setting with nothing in git enforcing it.
Close it with defense-in-depth across three independent layers:
1. IdP — operator-application.yaml blueprint binds an
ak_is_group_member("dezky-platform-admins") policy to the dezky-operator
app, so Authentik denies the OIDC flow for non-admins. The blueprint also
provisions the provider + application (state: created, so a fresh env is
built from code while an existing hand-made provider is left untouched).
Wire OPERATOR_OIDC_* into both authentik containers and mount the
blueprints dir on the worker (it applies blueprints, and previously lacked
the mount).
2. Operator app — require-platform-admin.global.ts requires platformAdmin and
routes a non-admin to not-authorized.vue, which triggers a full sign-out
(local + Authentik IdP) for shared-workstation safety. Fails open on a
transient /api/me error by design, to avoid mass-signout on platform-api
restarts; layers 1 and 3 contain the exposure.
3. platform-api — OperatorGuard (unchanged) requires dezky-operator audience
plus platformAdmin resolved from the DB on every request.
Also harden the partner surface: it shares the dezky-portal client with tenant
users so it has no IdP gate, and its /partner/* route middleware now fails
CLOSED when identity can't be confirmed.
Docs (AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md) and .env.example updated; the operator client secret
must be set before first boot since the blueprint now consumes it.
140 lines
6.3 KiB
YAML
140 lines
6.3 KiB
YAML
# Provisions the dezky-operator OIDC application AND restricts it to platform
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# admins — the IdP-level half of operator isolation, captured as code instead
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# of manual UI clicks.
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#
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# WHY: The operator portal's first line of defense is *which Authentik users
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# may complete its OIDC flow*. Without an application policy binding, ANY
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# Authentik user — a partner, a tenant admin, an end user — can authorize
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# against dezky-operator and land on the operator UI. platform-api's
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# OperatorGuard still 403s their data, and the operator app's
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# require-platform-admin middleware signs them out, but those are layers 2 and
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# 3. This blueprint is layer 1: Authentik itself refuses the login unless the
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# user is in `dezky-platform-admins` (the same group platform-api treats as the
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# source of truth for platformAdmin).
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#
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# CREATE-ONLY for the provider + application. The dezky-operator provider was
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# originally created by hand; its client_secret and scope mappings are live and
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# must not be clobbered. `state: created` means "create if absent, never update
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# if present" — so a FRESH environment gets the app built from this file, while
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# an EXISTING environment keeps its hand-made provider exactly as-is. The group,
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# policy, and binding use `state: present` so they reconcile (and the binding is
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# enforced) on both fresh and existing environments.
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#
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# The provider/app are matched by client_id / slug (both globally unique and
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# stable) rather than display name, so `state: created` reliably recognizes the
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# existing objects regardless of what they were named in the UI.
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#
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# Applied by the authentik-worker, which mounts this dir at /blueprints/custom
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# and reads OPERATOR_OIDC_CLIENT_ID / OPERATOR_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET from its env
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# (see docker-compose.yml). On a fresh env the !Env client_secret below must
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# match what the operator container uses (same .env var) so the two agree.
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#
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# VERIFY after apply (Authentik UI):
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# Applications → dezky-operator → Bindings lists
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# "operator-require-platform-admin" (enabled). Then: a non-admin test user is
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# denied at login; an admin user still gets in.
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version: 1
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metadata:
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name: dezky-operator-application
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labels:
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blueprints.goauthentik.io/instantiate: "true"
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entries:
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# ── Source of truth for operator privilege ───────────────────────────────
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# find-or-create; safe to reconcile whether made by hand or by platform-api's
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# bootstrap. Identified by name to match platform-api's
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# PLATFORM_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_GROUP (default "dezky-platform-admins").
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- model: authentik_core.group
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state: present
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identifiers:
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name: dezky-platform-admins
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attrs:
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name: dezky-platform-admins
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# ── OAuth2 / OIDC provider ───────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Create-only: never mutate the live, hand-made provider. Mirrors the portal
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# provider's shape (see docs/AUTHENTIK-SETUP.md §3.3): implicit-consent flow,
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# the default self-signed signing key, the standard openid/email/profile
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# scope mappings (the default `profile` mapping carries the groups claim that
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# platformAdmin bootstrap relies on), hashed sub, per-provider issuer.
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- id: operator-oauth2-provider
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model: authentik_providers_oauth2.oauth2provider
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state: created
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identifiers:
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client_id: !Env [OPERATOR_OIDC_CLIENT_ID, dezky-operator]
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attrs:
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name: dezky-operator
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client_type: confidential
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client_id: !Env [OPERATOR_OIDC_CLIENT_ID, dezky-operator]
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client_secret: !Env OPERATOR_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
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authorization_flow:
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!Find [
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authentik_flows.flow,
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[slug, default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent],
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]
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signing_key:
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!Find [
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authentik_crypto.certificatekeypair,
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[name, "authentik Self-signed Certificate"],
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]
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redirect_uris:
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- matching_mode: strict
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url: https://operator.dezky.local/auth/oidc/callback
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property_mappings:
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- !Find [
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authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping,
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[managed, "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-openid"],
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]
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- !Find [
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authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping,
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[managed, "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-email"],
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]
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- !Find [
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authentik_providers_oauth2.scopemapping,
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[managed, "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/scope-profile"],
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]
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sub_mode: hashed_user_id
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issuer_mode: per_provider
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# ── Application ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Create-only. Slug must stay `dezky-operator` — the issuer URL
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# (.../application/o/dezky-operator/) and platform-api's accepted audience
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# both derive from it.
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- id: operator-application
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model: authentik_core.application
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state: created
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identifiers:
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slug: dezky-operator
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attrs:
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name: Dezky Operator
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slug: dezky-operator
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provider: !KeyOf operator-oauth2-provider
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meta_launch_url: https://operator.dezky.local
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meta_description: Internal Dezky operator control plane. Platform admins only.
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# ── Access policy: require membership in dezky-platform-admins ────────────
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- id: operator-require-platform-admin
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model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
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state: present
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identifiers:
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name: operator-require-platform-admin
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attrs:
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name: operator-require-platform-admin
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expression: |
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return ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="dezky-platform-admins")
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# ── Bind the policy to the application ────────────────────────────────────
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# Authentik evaluates application policy bindings before issuing the
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# authorization, so a non-member is denied during the OIDC flow and never
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# reaches the operator app. `present` so it's enforced on fresh AND existing
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# environments.
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- model: authentik_policies.policybinding
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state: present
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identifiers:
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target: !KeyOf operator-application
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policy: !KeyOf operator-require-platform-admin
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attrs:
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enabled: true
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order: 0
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